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successful attacks requiring minimum assumptions and knowledge of the
target device by the adversary. In this paper, we compile recent contri-
butions and applications of MIA in a comprehensive study. From a the-
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1 Introduction
Embedded devices such as smart cards, mobile phones, PDAs and more recently
RFID tags or sensor networks are now closely integrated in our everyday lives.
These devices typically operate in hostile environments and hence, the data
they contain might be relatively easily compromised. For example, their phys-
ical accessibility sometimes allows a number of very powerful attacks against
cryptographic implementations. Contrary to classical cryptanalyses that target
the mathematical algorithms, such physical attacks take advantage of the pe-
culiarities of the devices on which the algorithms are running. One of the most
famous (and devastating) examples of physical attack is Differential Power Anal-
ysis (DPA), introduced by Kocher et al. in 1998 [15]. It demonstrates that by
monitoring the power consumption of a smart card, the cryptographic keys can
be rather efficiently extracted if no special countermeasures are taken. In the last
decade, many other side-channels were exhibited, including timing [14] and elec-
tromagnetic radiation [7, 23]. Both the theory and practice have been improved,
leading to advanced attacks such as correlation attacks [2], template attacks [3]
and higher-order attacks [18]. In addition, various types of countermeasures, such
as masking [10], or hiding [34], as well as better tools to analyze and evaluate
these attacks and countermeasures [28], have been proposed. A state-of-the-art
view of power analysis attacks can be found in [17].
The core idea of differential side-channel attacks is to compare some key-
dependent predictions of the physical leakages with actual measurements, in
order to identify which prediction (or key) is the most likely to have given rise to
the measurements. In practice, it requires both to be able to model the leakages
with a sufficient precision, in order to build the predictions, and to have a good
comparison tool (also called distinguisher) to efficiently extract the keys. At
CHES 2008, a side-channel distinguisher called Mutual Information Analysis
(MIA) was introduced [8]. This distinguisher aims at generality in the sense that
it is expected to lead to successful attacks without requiring specific knowledge
of, or restrictive assumptions about the device it targets. In other words, it
can cope with less precise leakage predictions than other types of side-channel
attacks. This generality comes at the price of a limited decrease of the attack
efficiency (i.e. an increase in the number of measurements required to perform a
successful key recovery) when the leakage model fits well enough to the physics.
For example, standard attacks using a correlation coefficient may work better
if the physical leakages linearly depend on the Hamming weight of the data
processed in a device, in the presence of a close to Gaussian noise distribution.
From a theoretical point of view, MIA can be seen as the non-profiled (or
unsupervised) counterpart of the information theoretic metric that has been es-
tablished in [28] as a measure of side-channel leakage. Hence, its main advantage
is that it can detect any (e.g. not only linear or monotonic) kind of data de-
pendency in the physical measurements. As a consequence, MIA is a useful tool
when evaluating the security of an implementation, in order to demonstrate its
side-channel attack resistance. By contrast, a less general distinguisher may give
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a false sense of security, just because it cannot capture the data dependencies
at hand. In general, MIA is well suited for “difficult” attack scenarios where
standard assumptions about the leakage behavior of a device may not hold.
Following the original work of Gierlichs et al. [8], various recent publications
investigated theoretical and practical issues related to MIA. For example, [19,
20, 33] discuss the statistical properties of the original distinguisher; [9, 20, 22,
30] consider its application to implementations protected by masking or other
countermeasures; and [29] performs exhaustive empirical comparisons of various
side-channel distinguishers, including MIA. In this paper, we compile these recent
results into a single comprehensive treatment. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. In Section 2, we recall the diverse information theoretic definitions
that are the theoretical background of MIA. We also describe our model for
side-channel attacks, inspired by [8, 28]. In Section 3, we carefully investigate the
properties of MIA when applied in a univariate attack scenario. In particular, we
detail the impact of a good probability density estimation when performing the
attacks. Section 4 addresses the advanced context of implementations protected
with a masking countermeasure. Finally, Section 5 gives our conclusions and lists
some open problems. All our analyses are backed up with experimental results.
This allows us to put forward the interesting features of MIA compared to other
techniques used to attack leaking devices.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Information theoretic definitions
Entropy. Let X be a random variable on a (discrete) space X , and x an element
from X . For every positive integer d, we denote by X a d-dimensional random
vector (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ X d, and by the letter x an element from X d.
The (Shannon) entropy [4] of a random variable X on a discrete space X is
a measure of its uncertainty during an experiment. It is defined as:
H [X] = −
∑
x∈X
Pr [X = x] · log (Pr [X = x]) .
The joint entropy of a pair of random variables (X,Y ) expresses the uncer-
tainty one has about the combination of these variables:
H [X,Y ] = −
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
Pr [X = x, Y = y] · log (Pr [X = x, Y = y]) .
The joint entropy is always greater than or equal to that of either variable,
with equality if and only if (iff) Y is a deterministic function of X. It is also
sub-additive, and equality occurs iff the two variables are independent:
max(H [X] ,H [Y ]) ≤ H [X,Y ] ≤ H [X] + H [Y ] .
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Finally, the conditional entropy of a random variable X given another vari-
able Y expresses the uncertainty on X which remains once Y is known:
H [X|Y ] = −
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
Pr [X = x, Y = y] · log (Pr [X = x|Y = y]) .
The conditional entropy is always greater than or equal to zero, with equality
iff X is a deterministic function of Y . It is also at most equal to the entropy of
X, and equality occurs iff the two variables are independent:
0 ≤ H [X|Y ] ≤ H [X] .
H [X] H [Y ]
H [X,Y ]
H [X|Y ] H [Y |X]I (X;Y )
Fig. 1. Information diagram.
All these relations are depicted in Figure 1. They can be straightforwardly
extended to continuous spaces by turning the previous sums into integrals. For
example, in this case the differential entropy is defined as:
H [X] = −
∫
X
Pr [X = x] · log (Pr [X = x]) dx.
The differential entropy can be negative, contrary to the discrete one. In order
to easily deal with hybrid situations combining discrete and continuous variables,
we denote by Pr[X = x] the value in x of the probability density function (pdf
for short) of the continuous variable X (generally denoted as fX(x)).
Mutual information. The mutual information is a general measure of the
dependence between two random variables. It expresses the quantity of informa-
tion one has obtained on X by observing Y . On a discrete domain, the mutual
information of two random variables X and Y is defined as:
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I (X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
Pr [X = x, Y = y] · log
(
Pr [X = x, Y = y]
Pr [X = x] · Pr [Y = y]
)
.
It can be seen as the Kullback-Leibler divergence [4] between the joint dis-
tribution Pr [X = x, Y = y] and the product distribution Pr [X = x] ·Pr [Y = y].
The mutual information can similarly be expressed as the expected value over
X of the divergence between the conditional probability Pr [Y = y|X = x] and
the marginal probability Pr [Y = y]:
I (X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
Pr [X = x]
∑
y∈Y
Pr [Y = y|X = x] · log
(
Pr [Y = y|X = x]
Pr [Y = y]
)
.
It is directly related to Shannon’s entropy through the following equations:
I (X;Y ) = H [X]−H [X|Y ] ,
= H [X] + H [Y ]−H [X,Y ] ,
= H [X,Y ]−H [X|Y ]−H [Y |X] .
The mutual information is always greater than or equal to zero, with equality
iff X and Y are independent. It is lower than the entropy of either variable, and
equality only occurs iff one variable is a deterministic function of the other. The
higher the mutual information, the stronger the dependency between X and Y :
0 ≤ I (X;Y ) ≤ min(H [X] ,H [Y ]).
It can again be straightforwardly extended to the continuous case:
I (X;Y ) =
∫
X
∫
Y
Pr [X = x, Y = y] · log
(
Pr [X = x, Y = y]
Pr [X = x] · Pr [Y = y]
)
dx dy.
Eventually, the mutual information between a discrete random variable X
and a continuous random variable Y is defined as:
I (X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
Pr [X = x]
∫
Y
Pr [Y = y|X = x] · log
(
Pr [Y = y|X = x]
Pr [Y = y]
)
dy,
or equivalently:
I (X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∫
Y
Pr [X = x, Y = y] · log
(
Pr [X = x, Y = y]
Pr [X = x] · Pr [Y = y]
)
dy.
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2.2 Pearson’s correlation coefficient
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is a simple measure of dependence between two
random variables X and Y . Computing it does not require to know the probabil-
ity density functions of X and Y , but it can express only the linear dependence
between these variables (whereas mutual information is able to detect any kind
of dependence). It is defined as follows:
ρ(X,Y ) =
cov(X,Y )
σX · σY =
E[XY ]− E[X] · E[Y ]
σX · σY . (1)
In this equation, cov(X,Y ) is the covariance between X and Y , E[X] denotes
the expected value of X and σX the standard deviation of X. The correlation
coefficient satisfies the following inequality:
0 ≤ |ρ(X,Y )| ≤ 1,
with the upper bound achieved iff Y is an affine function of X. The lower bound
is achieved if X and Y are independent but the opposite does not hold: X and
Y can be dependent and have their correlation equal to zero.
2.3 Side-channel cryptanalysis
In a side-channel attack, an adversary tries to recover secret information from
a leaking implementation, e.g. a software program or an IC computing a cryp-
tographic algorithm. As most cryptanalytic techniques, side-channel attacks are
based on a divide-and-conquer strategy. For example, in the context of a block
cipher implementation, one typically targets small pieces of the master key or a
round key - called subkeys in the following - one by one. The core idea is to com-
pare subkey-dependent models of the leakages with actual measurements. That
is, for each subkey candidate, the adversary builds models that correspond to the
leakage generated by the encryption of different plaintexts. Then, he evaluates
which model (i.e. which subkey) gives rise to the best prediction of the physi-
cal leakages, measured for the same set of plaintexts. As a matter of fact and
assuming that the models can be represented by a random variable X and the
leakages can be represented by a random variable Y , side-channel analysis can
be seen as the problem of detecting a dependence between these two variables.
In the rest of this paper, we consider that X is a discrete random variable
and that Y is a continuous random variable that is sampled with a sufficient res-
olution (e.g. using an oscilloscope). A consequence is that we also considered pdf
estimation techniques designed for continuous distributions (in Section 3.2, 4.4).
The next sections of the paper analyze the attack depicted in Figure 2, fol-
lowing the models in [8] and [28]. That is, we consider a device performing
several cryptographic computations Ek(p) on different plaintexts p drawn uni-
formly from the text space P, using some fixed key k drawn from the key space
K. While computing Ek(P ) (where P is a random variable over P), the device
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will handle some intermediate values (defined as sensitive variables in [24]) that
depend on the known input P and the unknown key k. In practice, the inter-
esting sensitive variables in a DPA attack are the ones that only depend on an
enumerable subkey s: we denote them as Vs,P . Anytime such a sensitive inter-
mediate value is computed, the device generates some physical leakage, denoted
as Yk,P (that potentially depends on all the key k, including the subkey s).
In order to perform a key recovery, an adversary first has to select a sensitive
value. Given that this value only depends on a subkey s, he can then evaluate its
result for the same plaintexts that have been used to generate Yk,P and all the
possible subkey candidates j ∈ S. It gives rise to different hypothetical values
Vj,P . Afterwards, the adversary uses a leakage model to map these values from
their original space V towards a hypothetical leakage space X . For example, a
usual model (that has been experimentally confirmed in numerous works e.g.
see [17]) is to take the Hamming weight of the values Vj,P . As a result, he
obtains |S| different models denoted as Xj,P , again corresponding to the different
subkey candidates. Eventually, he uses a distinguisher D to compare the different
models Xj,P with the actual leakages Yk,P . If the attack is successful, the best
comparison result (i.e. the highest value of the distinguisher) should be obtained
for the correct subkey candidate j = s. This procedure can then be repeated for
different subkeys in order to eventually recover the full key.
We mention that [8] uses the terms hypothetical leakages for Xj,P and ob-
servations for Yk,P while [28] uses the terms models for Xj,P and leakages for
Yk,P . We use the latter terminology in the following, but both are equivalent.
P
k
Vs,P Yk,P
j
Vj,P Xj,P
D
compute leak
predict model
j 6= s ?
Device
Adversary
Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of a side-channel key recovery attack.
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3 Univariate MIA
3.1 Basic principle
Following the previous informal description, the goal of a distinguisher is to
detect the dependencies between two random variables. For example, in the case
of a correlation attack [2], one simply needs to compute:
dj = ρˆ(Xj,P , Yk,P ),
where the hat sign indicates that we use an estimator. In practice, a usual choice
is the Pearson coefficient where the expected values and standard deviations of
Equation (1) are replaced by sample means and standard deviations. Similarly,
the distinguisher used in a mutual information analysis can be written as:
dj = Iˆ (Xj,P ;Yk,P ) .
For simplicity, we will omit the different subscripts of X and Y in the remainder
of the paper. The idea behind this latter procedure is that a meaningful partition
of Y , where each subset corresponds to a particular model value, will relate to
a side-channel sample distribution Pˆr[Y |X = x] distinguishable from the global
distribution of Pˆr[Y ]. The estimated mutual information will then be larger
than zero. By contrast, if the key guess is incorrect, the false predictions will
form a partition corresponding to a random sampling of Y and therefore simply
give scaled images of the global side-channel pdf. Hence, the estimated mutual
information will be equal (or close) to zero in this case.
Example. Let us consider a target implementation in which the adversary re-
ceives leakages of the form y = Hw(S(p⊕s))+n where Hw is the Hamming weight
function, S the 4-bit S-box of the block cipher Serpent, p a known plaintext, s
the target subkey of the attack and n is a Gaussian noise. Let us also assume
that the model X corresponds to Hw(S(p⊕j)). Figure 3 illustrates what happens
asymptotically for the correct and a wrong subkey hypothesis in the case of this
attack. It shows the higher dependence for the correct subkey (i.e. in the left
part of the figure) than for an incorrect one, as expected in a successful attack.
In theory, MIA tests a null hypothesis stating that the predicted leakages
and the measured ones are independent if the subkey hypothesis is false. When
this hypothesis is not verified, the adversary assumes that he found the correct
subkey. However, in practice there may exist certain dependencies between a
wrong subkey candidate and the actual leakages (e.g. the ghost peaks as defined
in [2]). Hence, the adversary generally selects the subkey that leads to the highest
distinguisher value. The efficiency of a distinguisher can be measured with a
success rate. As discussed in [28], a success can be strictly defined as a situation
in which the distinguisher reaches its maximum for the correct subkey (as we will
consider in the following), or softly defined as a situation in which the correct
subkey is highly rated by the distinguisher. Alternative metrics like the guessing
entropy can also be used to quantify how much a side-channel attack reduces
the average workload required to complete a key recovery.
8
Pr [Y = y] x = 0 x = 1
x = 2 x = 3 x = 4
y
Pr [Y = y,X = x]
X = 0 1 2 3 4
y0 y1 y3 y7 y15
. . . y2 y5 y11 . . .
y4 y6 y13
y8 y9 y14
. . . y10 . . .
y12
. . .
y
Pr [Y = y,X = x]
X = 0 1 2 3 4
y7 y0 y1 y5 y6
. . . y2 y3 y8 . . .
y13 y4 y10
y15 y9 y12
. . . y11 . . .
y14
. . .
Fig. 3. Joint probability densities Pr [Y = y,X = x] for different model values X = x
and marginal leakage probability Pr [Y = y] densities for the correct (left) and a wrong
(right) subkey hypothesis in the case of a 4-bit DPA attack.
3.2 PDF estimation tools
In order to perform a mutual information analysis, one first has to estimate
the probability density function of the joint distribution Pr [X = x, Y = y] (or
alternatively, the conditional distribution Pr [Y = y|X = x] and the marginal
distribution Pr [Y = y]) from a limited number of samples. In other words, one
needs to estimate the distribution of the leakages Y for different model values
X = x. The problem of modeling a probability density function from random
samples is a well studied problem in statistics, referred to as density estimation.
Several solutions exist, ranging from simple histograms to kernel density estima-
tion, data clustering [35] and vector quantization [31]. The authors of [8] used
histograms for density estimation as a proof of concept for MIA. But in certain
contexts, an attack’s efficiency (regarding the number of traces needed to recover
the key) can be improved by using more advanced techniques, possibly at the
cost of a higher computation load and memory requirement.
For example, some density estimation tools have been initially suggested in
[37] as relevant to side-channel attacks and then applied to MIA in [20, 33]. In
this section, we present two common ways of approximating densities, namely
histograms and kernels. We mention that these are two non-parametric meth-
ods. Since one interesting feature of MIA is that it does not rely on particular
assumptions on the leakage distributions, it seems a reasonable starting point.
However, parametric tools making more specific assumptions (e.g. that the pdf
of the leakages is a Gaussian mixture) could improve the efficiency of the attacks
in certain practically meaningful implementation contexts [16, 20].
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Histograms. Histogram estimation performs a partition of the samples by
grouping them into bins, as illustrated in the upper part of Figure 4. More
precisely, each bin contains the samples of which the value falls into a certain
range. The respective ranges of the bins have equal width and form a partition
of the range between the extreme values of the samples. Using this method, one
approximates a probability by dividing the number of samples that fall within a
bin by the total number of samples. For n bins denoted as b(i), the probability
is estimated as:
Pˆr[y ∈ b(i)] = #b(i)
q
,
where #b(i) is the number of samples in bin b(i) and q =
∑n
i=1 #b(i) is the
total number of samples. The optimal choice for the bin width h is an issue in
statistical theory, as different bin sizes can have great impact on the estimation.
For simple Gaussian distributions, reasonable choices are Scott’s rule [25] (h =
3.49×σˆ(Y )×q−1/3) and Freedman-Diaconis rule [6] (h = 2×IQR(Y )×q−1/3, IQR
= interquartile range). In side-channel attacks, and in particular for wrong key
hypotheses, one has to estimate leakage distributions which comprise multiple
source distributions (or components), e.g. Gaussian mixtures. While the above
mentioned methods can yield acceptable results in practice, their theoretical
foundation is not necessarily provided [13], in particular since in general, the best
pdf estimation does not necessarily give rise to the best subkey discrimination.
In [8] Gierlichs et al. suggest a different and simpler rule: namely to choose the
number of bins equal to the number of expected components in the distribution,
which is equal to the number of distinct model values.
y0 1 3 5 6 6.5
y0 1 3 5 6 6.5
Fig. 4. Histogram (top) and kernel-based (bottom) density estimations (thick line)
resulting from sample set {0, 1, 3, 5, 6, 6.5}, using bin width h = 1 or gaussian kernels
(dashed lines) with bandwidth h = 0.5, respectively.
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Kernels. Kernel density estimation is a generalization of histograms. Instead
of bundling samples together in bins, it adds (for each observed sample) a small
kernel centered on the value of the leakage to the estimated pdf, as illustrated in
the lower part of Figure 4. The resulting estimation is a sum of small “bumps”
that is much smoother than the corresponding histogram, which can be desirable
when estimating a continuous distribution. In such cases it usually provides
faster convergence towards the true distribution. Note that although this solution
requires to select a kernel and a bandwidth, it does not assume anything more
about the estimated pdf than histograms. The probability is estimated as:
Pˆr[Y = y] =
1
qh
q∑
i=1
K
(
y − yi
h
)
,
where yi denote the leakage samples and the kernel function K is a real-valued
integrable function satisfying
∫∞
−∞K (u) du = 1 and K(u) = −K(u) for all u.
Some kernel functions are represented in Table 1. Similarly to histograms,
the most important parameter is the bandwidth h. Its optimal value is the one
minimizing the AMISE (Asymptotic Mean Integrated Squared Error), which
itself usually depends on the true density. A number of approximation methods
have been developed, see [32] for an extensive review. In our case, we used the
modified rule of thumb estimator [12, 27]:
h = 1.06×min
(
σˆ(Y ),
IQR(Y )
1.34
)
× q− 15 .
kernel K(u) kernel K(u)
Uniform
1
2
i(u) Triangle (1− |u|)i(u)
Epanechnikov
3
4
(1− u2)i(u) Quartic 15
16
(1− u2)2i(u)
Triweight
35
32
(1− u2)3i(u) Tricube 70
81
(1− |u|3)3i(u)
Gaussian
1√
2pi
exp
(
−1
2
u2
)
Cosinus
pi
4
cos
(pi
2
u
)
i(u)
Table 1. Some kernel functions. i is defined as: i(u) = 1 if |u| ≤ 1, 0 otherwise.
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3.3 Experiments
The previous subsections discussed the theoretical ideas behind univariate MIA.
Quite naturally, it is also interesting to evaluate the extent up to which different
pdf estimations affect the efficiency of the distinguisher in practice, and how this
distinguisher relates to standard attacks using the correlation coefficient. For this
purpose, we carried out attacks based on the traces that are publicly available
in the DPA Contest [5]. We computed the first-order success rate as function of
the number of traces available to the adversary (i.e. encrypted messages), over
1000 independent experiments, using a Hamming distance leakage model.
The results of these experiments are represented in Figure 5, from which we
can extract two main observations. First, classical attacks using the correlation
coefficient are the most efficient in this simple context, where the models closely
fit to the physics. Second, the choice of a pdf estimation tool has a significant
impact on the efficiency of MIA. In particular, the kernel-based MIA seems to
perform better than its counterpart using histograms (we used 5-bin histograms,
following [8]). This can be explained by the large amount of algorithmic noise
that is present in the DPA contest measurements (i.e. the targeted architecture
contains a 64-bit register for the state, while the attack merely targets four of
them). More examples of univariate MIA experiments can be found in [19, 29].
messages
success rate
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
correlation
histogram MIA
kernel MIA
Fig. 5. Success rate of different attacks against the first DES S-box in the DPA Contest.
Note that when applying a kernel-based MIA, it is only the distribution of the
continuous random variable Y that is approximated with kernels. For the discrete
random variable X, we directly estimated the probability mass function. In other
words, we estimated one conditional distribution of Y per model value X = x.
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3.4 Discussion
Comparison with correlation attacks. As originally advertised by Gierlichs
et al. [8], MIA is a generic distinguisher in the sense that it can capture any type
of dependency between an adversary’s models and actual physical leakages. For
example, a successful correlation attack requires that ρˆ(Xs, Y ) > ρˆ(Xj , Y ), for
all subkey candidates j ∈ S and j 6= s. A successful MIA rather requires that
Iˆ(Xs;Y ) > Iˆ(Xj ;Y ). Hence, there are situations where correlation attacks are
unable to exploit the leakage dependencies while MIA can still succeed. However,
the fact that MIA can exploit more general dependencies is not directly related
to the efficiency of the distinguisher (i.e. its speed to discriminate the correct
key candidate). As illustrated in Figure 5, if the models and the leakages are
reasonably related through a linear relation, then the correlation coefficient can
do an excellent job in characterizing this relation quite fast.
In other words, there is a tradeoff between the efficiency of an attack and the
amount of assumptions required to mount it. In this respect, even the applica-
tion of MIA (that is clearly designed to work with little assumptions) can take
advantage of carefully selected parameters, as we now detail.
Choice of the model. As for any DPA attack, the good selection of a leak-
age model highly influences the efficiency of a distinguisher. The better a model
relates to the actual physics, the easier their relation will be observed through
the distinguisher. As detailed in [33], MIA better resists to model inaccuracies
than, e.g. correlation attacks. But a completely wrong model will not allow any
key recovery at all, for any attack. In fact, the problem of finding a good leakage
model is similar for all distinguishers and mainly relates to the engineering in-
tuition about the target device. In the following, we simply ensure that different
attacks are fed with the same models, when comparing them.
Note that regardless their connection to the physics, there are certain models
that will not be useful to the MIA distinguisher. For example, as detailed in [8,
20], attacking bijective S-boxes such as the AES Rijndael ones, with the identity
leakage modelX = V , will not lead to successful attacks. This is because different
subkey candidates merely lead to different permutations of a certain partition in
this context. And this feature has no effect on the conditional entropy and the
corresponding mutual information. This is in contrast with correlation attacks,
which may still be able to detect a (weak) linear dependence if it exists, but
not specific to MIA: most attacks based on leakage partitions suffer from the
same limitation [29, 33, 35]. We note that if an adversary aims to be perfectly
generic and to use an identity leakage model, he can always target intermediate
variables that do not bijectively depend on the key for a given plaintext. This is
possible either due to the S-box properties, as in the DES, or because he decides
to leave out some bits of the target values, e.g. predicting 6 bits out of 8 of the
AES S-box output, at the cost of a slightly increased algorithmic noise.
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Choice of the number of bins / bandwidth. In the same line, pdf estimation
tools also require to fix, e.g. the number of bins or the kernel bandwidth. It
implies a similar tradeoff between efficiency and flexibility. The more bins (or
the smaller the bandwidth), the more precise the pdf estimation and the more
dependencies can be estimated. But on the other hand, adding bins or reducing
the bandwidth also implies the need of more samples to reach a proper estimate
of the leakage pdf, which generally slows down the key extraction.
Summarizing, one of the main interests of MIA is that it allows running
differential side-channel attacks with minimum assumptions on the underlying
hardware. This can already be an advantage in certain univariate attacks (e.g.
if very little is known about the leakage model of an implementation protected
with a dual rail logic style such as [34], or if the exploitation of the leakage is non
trivial [22]). As the next section will underline, MIA can also be straightforwardly
extended towards second- and higher-order side-channel attacks.
4 Multivariate MIA against masked implementations
Masking is one of the most widely used countermeasures to protect implemen-
tations of block ciphers against side-channel analysis (see, e.g. [1, 10]). Efficient
side-channel key recovery in the presence of masking is therefore an important
issue for the security of embedded cryptography. In this section, we explain how
MIA can be generalized to break masked implementations. For this purpose,
we briefly recall the principles of masking and higher-order side-channel attacks
first. Then, the rest of the section exactly follows the structure of the univariate
case (i.e. we present the basic principle of the attack, describe two pdf estimation
tools, provide experiments and discuss our results in Sections 4.1 to 4.6).
4.1 The masking countermeasure
The basic principle of masking can be explained as follows: every sensitive vari-
able v occurring during the computation is randomly split into d shares v1, . . . ,
vd in such a way that the following relation is satisfied for a group operation ?:
v1 ? v2 ? · · · ? vd = v . (2)
Typically, one can use the bitwise XOR or a modular addition as group operation.
The d− 1 shares v2, . . . , vd (called the masks) are randomly chosen and the last
one, v1 (called the masked variable) is processed such that it satisfies (2).
Assuming that the masks are uniformly distributed, masking renders every
single intermediate value during a cryptographic computation non-sensitive. As a
result, the univariate side-channel attacks of the previous section are not possible
anymore. But the vector of leakages y1, . . . , yd resulting from the observation
of the d shares is still dependent on a sensitive variable. Consequently, masking
can be overcome by higher-order side-channel attacks that jointly exploit the
14
leakages of several intermediate variables. The goal of such attacks is to exhibit
a dependency between the d-dimensional random vector Y associated to the
shares’ leakages and the random variable Xj associated to the attacker’s models
for a key guess j ∈ S. In the following, we first limit ourselves to second-order
attacks and denote the random vector Y by the couple of random variables
(Y1, Y2). The generalization to higher-orders will be discussed in Section 4.6.
4.2 Second-order differential power analysis
Second-order DPA has been initially introduced by Messerges in [18] to defeat
masking in the case d = 2, using the difference-of-means test as distinguisher. It
has since been improved by using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. In order to
apply such a distinguisher, second-order DPA first applies a combining function
C to the pair of leakages (Y1, Y2). As a result, a univariate signal that can be
correlated with the adversary’s models is obtained. The attack is then similar to
the first-order case and just consists in estimating the coefficient:
dj = ρˆ (X,C(Y1, Y2)) .
If the combining function C and the model X are well-chosen (which is briefly
discussed in Section 4.6), then the maximum correlation should again be ob-
served for the correct subkey candidate j = s. Several combining functions have
been proposed in the literature. Two of them are commonly used: the product
combining [1] which consists in multiplying the two signals and the absolute
difference combining [18] which computes the absolute value of the difference
between two signals. [21] confirmed the hint of [1] that centering the leakages
before combining them by product yields a better combining function in the con-
text of a second-order DPA with leakages closely following a Hamming weight
model. The resulting normalized product combining is defined as:
C(Y1, Y2) =
(
Y1 − Ê[Y1]
)
·
(
Y2 − Ê[Y2]
)
.
Although second-order attacks using the correlation coefficient do lead to
successful key recoveries, they are not optimal from an information theoretic
point of view. Indeed, the application of a combining function to the leakages
inevitably leads to a loss of information [1]. This motivates the investigation of
alternative distinguishers in this context. The next subsection details how MIA
can be extended to higher-order attacks, as independently described in [9, 20].
4.3 Multivariate MIA: basic principle
In general, the mutual information is a multivariate operator that can easily
deal with the dependencies of multiple variables. Taking the example of two-
dimensional leakages Y = (Y1, Y2), the information diagram of Figure 6 directly
suggests that there are different ways to detect such dependencies, including:
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Fig. 6. Information diagram for second-order attacks.
1. One can simply consider the mutual information between the models X and
the random vector Y = (Y1, Y2), just as in Section 2.1, i.e. compute:
I (X; Y) =
∑
x∈X
Pr [X = x]
∫
Y2
Pr [Y = y|X = x] · log
(
Pr [Y = y|X = x]
Pr [Y = y]
)
dy.
2. Another solution is to estimate the multivariate mutual information which
is an attempt to extend the definition of mutual information to more than
two variables. It is defined as I(X;Y1;Y2) = I(Y1;Y2)− I(Y1;Y2|X), where:
I(Y1;Y2|X) =
∑
x∈X
Pr [X = x]
[
I(Y1;Y2|X = x)
]
.
3. Eventually, it is possible to use the total correlation [36] C(X,Y1, Y2) =
H[X] + H[Y1] + H[Y2]−H[X,Y1, Y2] that can also be written as:
C(X,Y1, Y2) =
∑
x∈X
∫
Y2
Pr [x, y1, y2] · log
(
Pr [x, y1, y2]
Pr [x] · Pr [y1] · Pr [y2]
)
dy.
These definitions can be related by standard information theoretic relations:
I (X; (Y1, Y2)) = I (X;Y1) + I (X;Y2)− I (X;Y1;Y2) ,
C(X,Y1, Y2) = I (X;Y1) + I (X;Y2) + I (Y1;Y2)− 2 · I (X;Y1;Y2) .
Depending on the applications, one or another definition will be preferable.
For example, if a good masking scheme is used, the variables X and Y1 are inde-
pendent (and so are X and Y2). Hence, the contribution of the terms I(X;Y1) and
I(X;Y2) will not be useful in this context. As for the univariate case, these equa-
tions all lead to an asymptotically successful key recovery. But the convergence
towards the correct subkey may differ in practice, in function of the physical
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leakages and distinguisher selected by the adversary. In every case, detecting
the multivariate dependencies requires to estimate one multivariate probability
density function for each modeled value. The next section briefly discusses the
adaptation of the histogram and kernel methods for this purpose.
4.4 Multivariate PDF estimation tools
Histograms. The histogram method is straightforwardly extended by parti-
tioning the d-dimensional sample space into bins of equal width along a given
coordinate (or orthotopes). For each bin denoted as b(i1, . . . , id), the probability
is estimated as:
Pˆr [y ∈ b(i1, . . . , id)] = #b(i1, . . . , id)
q
,
where (i1, · · · , id) denotes the index of a bin, #b(i1, . . . , id) the number of sam-
ples in bin b(i1, . . . , id) and q the total number of samples available.
Kernels. The kernel density estimation method cannot be directly extended
to the multivariate case in general. But different assumptions allow overcoming
this issue. For example, one can use Gaussian kernels and apply the formula:
Pˆr [Y = y] =
1
q(2pi)d/2|ΣYY|1/2
q∑
i=1
exp
(
− 1
2h2
(y − yi)′Σ−1Y Y (y − yi)
)
,
where ΣYY is the leakage covariance matrix. Alternatively, if we additionally
make the hypothesis that the coordinates of the multivariate distribution are
pairwise independent (which is the case for masking schemes), it is then possible
to use the product of any kernel defined as:
Pˆr [Y = y] =
1
q
q∑
i=1
 d∏
j=1
K
(
yj − yij
hj
) .
Assuming a normal kernel and a normal distribution for the leakages with ΣYY
diagonal, the rule-of-thumb for the bandwidth of Section 3.2 becomes (see [26]):
h∗j = σˆjq
−1/(d+4),
with σˆj denoting the diagonal elements of the leakage covariance matrix. Alter-
native bandwidth selection rules include the one of Hall et al. [11].
Example. In order to illustrate the estimation methods described above in
the context of MIA against masked implementations, we applied them on sim-
ulated leakage traces corresponding to a masked AES S-box. We generated the
distribution of the pairs (y1, y2) such that y1 = Hw(S(p ⊕ k) ⊕ m) + n1 and
y2 = Hw(m) + n2 for S being the AES S-box, m being a random mask and
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the ni’s being (independent) random Gaussian noises with standard deviation
0.3. We then applied both histogram and kernel density methods to estimate
the probability density functions Pr [Y|X = x] for the Hamming weight model
X = Hw(S(P ⊕ j)) and pairs (x, j) ∈ X ×K. Figures 7 and 8 show the obtained
pdfs when X = 1 for the correct subkey guess (upper part of the figure) and for
a wrong subkey guess (lower part of the figure). As expected, we observe that
the densities obtained for the correct key guess are less dissipated than for the
wrong key guess, which seem to randomly sample the leakage space.
4.5 Experiments
In order to confirm the previous theory and compare the various methods to
implement a second-order MIA, we performed different experiments against the
Boolean masking scheme of [10] implemented for the DES. For simplicity, our
descriptions focus on a representative step of the encryption that consists of a
single masked S-box lookup (we targeted the first DES S-box S1). As for Figures
7 and 8, each measurement trace is composed of (i.e. reduced to) two leakages
samples: Y2 which is generated by the random mask, and Y1 which is generated
by the masked output of the S-box. This masking scheme ensures that the cir-
cuit never processes unmasked intermediate values. Eventually, our experimental
setup monitors a smart card embedding an 8-bit RISC microcontroller of which
the bus was reset to zero before and after each memory access. The power mea-
surements represent the voltage drop across a 10Ω resistor inserted in the circuit
ground. We used this setup to analyze the following scenarios.
1. Different distinguishers. We applied the two first multivariate MIA de-
scribed in Section 4.3. In other words, we computed the mutual information
Iˆ(X; Y) and the multivariate mutual information Iˆ(X;Y1;Y2). In addition
and for the reference, we also applied a second-order attack using the nor-
malized product combining function described in Section 4.2.
2. Different leakage models. We considered both a Hamming weight leak-
age model X = Hw(S1(P ′ ⊕ j)) and an identity leakage model making no
assumptions at all on the leakages X = S1(P ′ ⊕ j), where P ′ are the six
known plaintext bits entering S1 in the DES implementation.
3. Different pdf estimation tools. As for the univariate case, we directly
estimated the probability mass function of the discrete predictions X. And
the pdfs of the leakages Y were estimated both with histograms and with
kernels. When using histograms, the number of bins is chosen according
to the size of the model space X . More precisely, we used five bins when
assuming a Hamming weight leakage model and sixteen bins for the identity
leakage model. In the case of kernel density estimation, a Gaussian kernel is
used and the bandwidth is selected according to Hall’s rule.
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Fig. 7. Histogram method in the context of a second-order attack against an 8-bit
masked S-box, for the correct (top) and a wrong (bottom) subkey hypothesis.
Fig. 8. Kernel method in the context of a second-order attack against an 8-bit masked
S-box, for the correct (top) and a wrong (bottom) subkey hypothesis.
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4. Different noise levels. Eventually, we considered two noise levels. In the
first one, the device simply computes the masked 4-bit S-box outputs, leaving
the 4 remaining bits in the bus datapath stuck to zero. This scenario gives
rise to measurements with very little noise, as acknowledged by a correlation
coefficient of approximately 0.99 when attacking an unprotected S-box. In
the second scenario, we randomly flip the remaining bits on the bus, giving
rise to 4 bits of independent, so-called algorithmic, noise on Y1 and Y2.
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Fig. 9. Low noise scenario: success rate of attacks against a masked implementation of
the first DES S-box, for Hamming weight (left) and identity (right) leakage models.
The results of our experiments for these different contexts are shown in Fig-
ures 9 and 10 from which we can extract the following observations.
First and quite naturally, a good leakage model helps all the attacks under
investigation. In particular, since the target device of our experiments closely
follows a Hamming weight leakage model, this assumption always improves the
success rate when compared to the identity leakage model. Note that the impact
of this good leakage model is weaker in the case of a correlation attack, since the
correlation between 4-bit values and their Hamming weights is high (≈ 0.81).
Second, the pdf estimation tools have a strong impact on MIA’s efficiency,
confirming the univariate experiments of Section 3.3. Interestingly, the amount
of noise in the leakages can significantly influence which estimation tool is best.
For example, histograms perform well in the low noise scenario with a Hamming
weight leakage model. The reason is that the leakage probability densities then
behave like a Dirac comb that is well approximated by a 5-bin histogram. When
moving to an identity leakage model and increasing the noise, this advantage
vanishes, as witnessed by the better efficiency of the kernel estimation method
in this case. In other words, kernel-MIA gains interest compared to histogram-
MIA, when the amount of noise in the physical leakages increases.
In our experiments, the second-order DPA using the correlation coefficient
and a normalized product combining function is the most efficient. This obser-
vation can again be explained by the fact that the investigated leakages have
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Fig. 10. High noise scenario: success rate of attacks against a masked implementation
of the first DES S-box, for Hamming weight (left) and identity (right) leakage models.
strong linear dependencies with the Hamming weights of the target intermedi-
ated values. It is also well in line with the corrected simulated experiments in
[20] that we give in Appendix A. Note that the efficiency of MIA compared to
2nd-order DPA gets worse when increasing the noise in our case.
Third, the best methods for applying MIA to two-dimensional leakages de-
pends on the physical leakages, measurement noise, models and pdf estimation
method used by the adversary. But they do not exhibit strongly different effi-
ciencies. Overall, these experiments also follow the analysis in [30], which shows
that the efficiency of non-profiled (second-order) side-channel distinguishers is
difficult to predict and highly dependent on the implementation context.
4.6 Discussion
Generalization to higher-orders. The previous descriptions and experiments
were given for the example of a second-order attack. But the application of MIA
naturally extends to attacks of any order (as the normalized product combining
function). A third-order example is given in [9]. Among the three methods for
applying MIA to multivariate contexts in Section 4.3, the first and third ones
directly generalize to more dimensions. Computing the multivariate mutual in-
formation can also be done, by using the following recursion:
I(X;Y1;Y2; . . . ;Yd) = I(X;Y1;Y2; . . . ;Yd−1)− I(X;Y1;Y2; . . . ;Yd−1|Yd).
Choice of parameters. Finally, choosing the right leakage model, number of
bins or bandwidth impacts also higher-order MIA, just as discussed in Section
3.4 for the univariate case. Additionally, MIA gets rid of the combining func-
tion which removes the need to carefully select it. Directly characterizing the
dependencies of the joint leakage distributions is also a better choice from an in-
formation theoretic point of view. As a consequence, MIA appears as a promising
approach for dealing with any advanced application in which successfully attack-
ing protected devices requires to process high dimensional leakages.
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5 Conclusion and open problems
A comprehensive treatment of MIA was presented. It compiles a theoretical jus-
tification for this new distinguisher and its application to practically important
scenarios. Namely, we considered both first-order side-channel attacks against
an unprotected implementation and second-order side-channel attacks against
a masked implementation. Our results put forward the generic nature of MIA
and its potential to apply to a large range of cryptographic devices. They also
raise several open questions, mainly related to the exploitation of this generic-
ness. Since the application of MIA implies to select a number of parameters, the
best selection of those parameters is an interesting scope for further research.
For example, our results show that histograms are quite efficient to characterize
low noise measurements while kernel density estimation better deals with noisy
situations. But plugging in other efficient probability density estimation tools
in the analysis of side-channel leakages, potentially taking advantage of certain
reasonable assumptions, may lead to an increased efficiency for MIA. Finally, it
would be interesting to apply MIA to implementation contexts where its gener-
icness could be fully exploited, e.g. devices protected with logic styles that do
not exhibit a simple (Hamming weight or distance) leakage model.
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A Corrected results for the 2nd-order attacks in [20]
Table 2. Second-order attack on DES S-box – Number of measurements required to
achieve a success rate of 90% according to the noise standard deviation σ.
Attack \ σ 0.5 1 2 5 7 10
2O-CPA (φ = Hw, abs. difference) 300 800 5000 200000 10
6+ 106+
2O-CPA (φ = Hw, norm. product) 300 400 3000 70000 300000 10
6+
2O-MIAH (φ = Id, Scott’s Rule) 1200 7000 75000 10
6+ 106+ 106+
2O-MIAH (φ = Id, Rule in [8]) 1800 7000 40000 1000000 10
6+ 106+
2O-MIAK (φ = Id) 600 2500 25000 600000 10
6+ 106+
2O-MIAH (φ = Hw, Scott’s Rule) 600 2700 34000 10
6+ 106+ 106+
2O-MIAH (φ = Hw, Rule in [8]) 350 1300 9000 350000 10
6+ 106+
2O-MIAK (φ = Hw) 300 1300 9000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
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